Ndb2010's Blog

"Kiedy wyeliminuje się niemożliwe wówczas to, co zostanie, bez względu na to, jak byłoby nieprawdopodobne, musi być prawdą." Arthur Conan Doyle

10.04.2010 – ENGLISH

MAK – manipulating aspects of catastroph.*

The final report concerning the disaster of  Tu-154m no.101 aeroplane presented by  MAK committee arouses so large contradictions that the Polish committee under  leadership of J.Miler wrote 148 pages of remarks. The number of remarks elevated around 210 pages at the beginning but it was shortened most likely because anxiety about “not medial” fact that Polish respond contain more pages to the report than report it self.

Even J.Miller’s commission in answer admits that most of MAK report conclusions was not confirmed by any evidence leaving only few pages as helpful aid in finding reason of  catastrophe. Most of  it was focused in creating fake environment of “on-board pressure”, suggestions and psychological/emotionally based  crew members analysis.

However it is possible to read out from MAK report a lot more informations.

Let’s move back in time…

Pulling rudder towards oneself.

Analysing the issues connected with this point I can say, that my remarks made in relation found confirmation in MAK report. „Manners in help whitch MAK committee attempt to conceal facts-concerning this instant moment when crew switches off manually all channels of the automatic pilot-may wake up shock. It is life-size portrait expressing volume of arrogance kept by MAK while judging inteligence of  Polish Nation” – from K.M. Interview given to „Gazata Polska” newspaper.

Simple connection of few facts provided by MAK is more then enough to highlight motivation of this commission. Handing over false informations, authenticating them through placing  in oficial  report is part of making us believe in pilots guilt.It can be compared with placing a smoking gun in hand of dead victim. This particular activity points out and  in most explicit manner characterizes distorting and concealing the truth about what realy happened 10’th of April 2010..

On page 98 (english version) MAK committee finnal report states that the pilot pulled the rudder towards himself at 10:40:55 hour , 30 metres at ASL suggesting that altitude reading taken by commander descent from radio altimeter. On page 99 (english version)  MAK commission  claims that in this moment aeroplane lose height with speed  8 m/sec.

On this same page MAK commission publishes fragment which is worth quoting ;

(…)Note: Loss of altitude while the Tu-154 aircraft terminates descent with the flight parameters equal it those in the accident flight (V=280km/h, Vy=7.5-8.0 m/sec.), with vertical acceleration of Ny=1,3 in case of correct and timely actions is 30m(…)

Taking into consideration a fact that centre of  signal sent by NDB marker is portraying its location – we can accept  , that according to MAK at 10:40:57 hour ( that is 2 seconds after rudder move was registered ) plane was in distance 1.05km from runway start point. On this base it is possible to state , that assessing plane speed suggested by MAK in this section ( 75 m/sec.) that pulling rudder according MAK had place 30 m above ground levell and in distance 1,2 km from runway treshold. Judging the graph from page 87 (English version) we can read that height 30 metres above ground level equals in this case 252 metres ASL. From the description , page 73-86 of MAK report (english version) it is resulting that the first contact with trees had place in 1.1km distance from the runway treshold and with 11 metres height  above ground level – that gives 244 metres ASL ( Above Sea Level ). It needs to be add that shape of terrain causes that between point of first contact with trees (1.1 km ) and point of plane fall ( 520 m to runway treshold ) terrain elevates about +20 metres in harmony to plane course.

MAK commission on next pages of report provides location of further marks left by plane : in distance 930 metres from runway treshold Tu-154m plane elevation equals 4 metres above theground  ( 248 m ASL), next in distance 850 of metres from runway  treshold plane hit birch tree at height 6 metres and was at 253 m ASL then. It is visible that on distance of 250 m between closer NDB ( 1.1 km ) and damaged birch tree ( 850 m ) plane altitude increased 11 metres in 3 seconds.

Natural lowering of plane in this case was only 8 metres while MAK states that if we take suggested in report plane speed 8m/s – plane should definitely loose at least 30 m. With all confidence it can be said that moment when commander pulled rudder happened far earlier.

Graph from page 156 (english version) in addiction to fact highlited by Polish pilots shows that TU 154 M pilot pulled rudder approx. 4 seconds earlier that MAK states.

It means that  conclusions and findings as well as recording of automatic pilot being switched off  are all incorrect.

One should pay attention to record containing sound sygnals of autopilot channels being switched off. Controversial record also states that with elevation 10 metres above the ground ,signal heared when plane passes NDB beacon last for 2.5 second. If we take  characteristic of signal field it came clear that signal lenght 2.5 second equals height of 100-120 m. Not to mention 10 m in MAK report.

Wrong NDB signal lenght, wrong times of signals marking auto-pilot chanels being switched off, next recorded earlier that it is suggested by MAK signals when pilot pulls rudder- all above shows that genuine,indivisible recording of IM Signal (800 Hz ) and AFCS ( 400 HZ ) placed at 10:40:56 ( graph. 45 , English version )  oryginaly was in different place of recording.

Russians preparated emphasis ,  „ under pressure atmosphere”.

The MAK committee final report based on shortened version of stenograms  whitch MAK worked out alone in June 2010. The similar, earlier version together with copy of report was handed over to Poland in form of CD recording in May 2010. Newest analyses  made by J.Miler committee specialists demonstrated, that stenograms dated MAY 2010 as well as version dated JUNE 2010 ( placed by Russians in the final report ) differ considerably from what Poles deciphered on the base of copy handed in MAY 2010. Single words inserted by Russians  into shortened stenographic records in May 2010 and which existed through 9 months actualy had in intention planting atmosphere of pressure created by passengers of the aeroplane and aimed directly into crew leader. However Polish analyses of the record MARS-BM CVR (Cocpit Voice Recorder)  demonstrates explicitly

that recording do not containes a smallest piece of evidence that any kind of pressure was made on the crew  by none of passengers of Tu-154m.

Above  remarks were all included in Polish respond to MAK report. They were all ignored and majority of the final report of MAK committee still contain thesis about pressure that has no confirmation in any sort of evidence .

(…) Navigator of Polish Tupolew wasn’t afraid during the flight to Smoleńsk, that president Lech Kaczyński ( 61 years old, Rest in peace.) „will be nervous”, and the commander of the crew didn’t ask the director from Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mariusz Kazana ( 50 years ols, Rest in peace.) to”ask the Head what he(pilot) has to do”. Such words – opposite to what Russians told  – were not determine on recordings presented by the Polish committee on Tuesday. Polish specialists heard words different than MAK. All fregments which were a receipt of  pressure on the Polish crew for Russians  were not determin. – this lecture is undermining the Russian version about pressure on the crew – said major Michał Fiszer for TVN24(…)

After presentation of deciphered audio recording from CVR made by J.Miler specialists and publication of Polish remarks to MAK final raport it cames to an absurd situations. Part of Polish-speaking press which supported  Russian variant through all of 9 months that elapsed from 10.IV.2010 stated, that from this day forward -lack of pressure for landing was a pressure it selve…

Injuring reading Polish CVR copy it came clear ,that the only issue placed in Russian version of stenographic record dated May 2010 and treating gen.A.Błasik (10:39:07) and confirming his presence in the cabin is significantly different from what J.Miler committee presented. Words described by MAK as woice of gen.A.Błasik ( explaining wings mechanization) in Polish version are far shorter and said through the navigator and the 2nd pilot.

Only existance of General A.Blasik voice as well as pressure in cabin have place in Russian version of report.

Only Polish person that listen to original CVR recording ( in May 2010) was E.Klich, acredited to work with Russians.He declared that when he had listened to original tapes from black boxes of government tu-154m  couldn’t hear any voices belong to anyone  outside the crew. He changed his mind when he recieved sheet of paper sent by MAK committee on which these voices appeared .

One more time history makes a circle. Famous German newspapers printed and planted in pockets of murdered  Polish Oficers in 1941 were supposed to move away guilt from Russia. This way Russian Burdenko Committee covered the order made by  J.Stalin – order of murdering Polish elite in Russian camps. In similiar way similiar sheets of paper,  containing (this time) evidences of deadly pressure, were supposed to move the guilt away from W.Putins Russia.

It is a cruel laugh of history.  When in 1941 Burdenko Committee was called to life by J.Stalin – MAK Committee was  called to life by W.Putin.

Firts contacts with obstacles – contradictions to MAK report.

In this place it is worthwhile quoting the fragment of final report of MAK committee (page 12-13, english version)

„(…) The Tu-154M crew continued coming in to land and lowering on the straight line to landing . In distance about 1100 metres from  26 threshold (WPP) , ~35 metres to the left with relation to extended treshold axis ,  about 11 metres above ground level it cames to first collision with the top of a tree. The collision took place before the closer radio beacon (BPRM) (with WPP 26 situated in the distance of 1050 m from the threshold) (…) Next, after ~245 m from point of first collision and having side tilt ~60 m to the left from extended WPP axis it cames to collision with birch (diameter of the trunk  30-40 cm) what led to destruction of part of plane left wing and violent tilt to the left .Next  in turned around position (undercarriage pointing upwords ), the aeroplane collided with the Earth and was entirely destroyed. (…)

There are large discrepancy oround plane location (1.1km from airfield) and location of first contacts with natural obstacles as well as the description which MAK committee introduced. The Polish version prepared under leadership of minister of  Home Office and Administraction J.Miler  as well as version of MAK committee are mutually exclusive as well as – in both versions – essential facts are concealed and left unsaid.

Drawing at page 160 of MAK report (English version.) points out that deviation from the axis took 35-40 metres out in the 1.1km distance and it decreased. Contact with birch (850 metres away from the threshold) changed trajectory of flight diametrically, caused rapid left turn and plane fall approx.150 metres to the left from runway axis and in distance  350-600 metres from runway treshold.

However description of damage made to the trees placed at pages 83-87(English version) and statement of  E.Klich (only Polish person accredited to work with and by MAK committee) points out that in distance 1.1km plane was tilt to runway axis approx.15-20 m and becouse of unknown reasons rapidly increased its distance to runway axis. From interview of E.Klich for the „Gazeta Polska” newspaper :

– „GP”: Do you have any reservations according to radio beacon operation?

– E.K.: Crew of JAK 40 highlited certain issues.

– „G.P.”: Those „issues” are in fact serious accusations – operating of radio beacon was disturbed , the pointer of radio compass changed over to it has leaned once to the right, once to the left with value 10 degrees each side.

– E.K.:upolew went very precisely, he went exactly above closer radio beacon , tilted aside from axis for only 20 metres, and there are two kinds of evidence to it. First – the first young birch cut and further…

-”G.P.” :But this young birch grows way further that 20m.

–                   E.K.: I am asking to listen to all. There is the other evidence. A spark went between the closer radio beacon aerial and the wing.It was testified by witness. Distance between plane wing and aerial pull out lines  could not be bigger than 3 metres (physicists could determine it) so such spark could „jump” between them. You should add the half of  plane span which is about 17 m. It shows that  plane’s fuselage could not be tilted from the runway axis more than 20 metres.

Taking accessible facts and contradictions into consideration it is possible to accept, that:

– something occured around closer beacon area when crew was trying to save the plane , something that coused plane to increase its tilt from runway axis. Contact with birch what changed the line of flight-practically coused no influence in flight trajectory( what was strongly propagated earlier by MAK ).

– There is a big probability of artificiall preparation of  tracks left on  damaged tree in the aim of authenticating the preliminary report of the MAK committee dated  May 2010.

– Differences can result from the fact that a probability of disrupting the GPS signal and changes in the reading exists. The record was differed from reality.

Picture no. 1. Trajectory of flight according to the description from page 10-13 of MAK

report (English version)

Picture no.2.  Visualisation of  individual damage distances made to obstacles and Tu-154m wingspan , version no.1 from the deck computer and GPS data (contrary to the information about trees damage and the witnesses’ testimony)

Picture no.3 : graphic depicting , version no.1 from the deck computer and GPS data (contrary to the information about damage to trees and the witnesses’ testimony)

Picture no.4. Probable trajectory of the plane.

This variant have place in accordance with damage made to natural obstacles and parameters of flight, telling that power produced by the engines fell down to 38% just a moment before first contact with trees . After presentation of photography contained one of the engines to a specialists their opinion  pointed out to the possibility that the engine did not work in time of crash (it stopped before plane hits the ground ) .

So at present there are two trajectories of fatal flight. Both excluding each other :

1. Based on FMS/TAWS records (GPS).

2. Based on damage made to natural obstacles.

Regardless to reasone – matter of two flight lines was not explained neither by the MAK committee nor through the J.Miler committee and still stay unsolved.






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